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Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011. 
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US$85.00 (cloth ISBN 978-0-19-956580-1) 
 
 
Responsibility and Distributive Justice is a collection of 13 new, high-quality essays 
written by some of the most well-known philosophers working on responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism (RSE) or, more generally, in the field of distributive justice. It will be of 
particular interest to those who already have a good understanding of the relevance of 
responsibility to distributive justice, and are keen to keep up to date with the debate or are 
interested in responsibility’s relevance to a particular topic, e.g., health care policy.  
 
Richard J. Arneson’s essay, which opens the collection, is the only contribution 
that would be particularly useful to those new to the field of RSE, as it helps to provide 
an overview of some of the most significant distinctions. Arneson breaks luck 
egalitarianism (as RSE is often called) down into the components of ‘luckism’ and 
‘egalitarianism’, highlighting different aspects of each of these components—such as 
whether we require equality, priority to the worst off, or sufficiency—and he briefly 
sketches some criticisms of RSE and potential rebuttals.  
 
Marc Fleurbaey highlights two sets of distinctions that he believes are significant 
but neglected in the RSE literature. He claims we should distinguish first between 
adopting a liberal or utilitarian interpretation of responsibility, and second between 
focusing on compensation or reward. The possible combinations of these choices result in 
four different approaches to equal opportunities which, Fleurbaey claims, are particularly 
important to distinguish from one another, as there are considerable differences in the 
consequences of adopting either a liberal or an utilitarian approach. 
 
Stemplowska considers three different versions of RSE. She argues that in its 
most convincing form, where it is based on respect for equal moral status, RSE can be 
reconciled with social equality. While social egalitarianism is presented as an alternative 
to RSE and one that is claimed by its advocates to represent ‘genuine’ egalitarianism, 
Stemplowska finds the supposed conflict between these views to be exaggerated: social 
equality, she claims, should be understood as conditional upon respect for equal moral 
status.   
 
Advocates of social equality have raised the specific concern that RSE may lead 
us to abandon those who make imprudent choices. Avner de-Shalit and Jonathan Wolff’s 
contribution argues in favor of a responsibility-sensitive principle of weak asymmetry, 
which may avoid or reduce the problem of abandonment by considering the relevance of 
responsibility disproportionately depending on whether the choices individuals make are 
good or bad. They argue that bad choices should be penalized to a lesser extent than good 
choices should be rewarded. 
 
Philosophy in Review XXXII (2012), no. 2 
 112 
Another major criticism of RSE, which Stemplowska highlights in her essay, is 
that it is often accused of being irrelevant to policy. Shlomi Segall and Norman Daniels 
demonstrate how responsibility can be applied to health, and, in the case of Daniels, 
directly to health care policy. Segall argues in favor of a luck prioritarian principle 
applied to opportunities for health, which he aims to show is superior to applying a 
Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity. In contrast, Daniels defends a 
Rawlsian approach over luck egalitarianism, arguing that our social responsibility to 
promote health should be prioritized over individual responsibility. He explores the 
application of each of these approaches to some recent attempts to incorporate individual 
responsibility for health into health insurance packages in the US and Germany. 
 
Like Daniels, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen is critical of RSE. Lippert-Rasmussen 
highlights a number of ambiguities in how luck egalitarianism is formulated with regards 
to whether it applies to individuals or groups. Once we are clearer about individual vs. 
collective avoidability and unavoidability, he argues, we will find that responsibility is 
actually of less significance to justice than many believe.  
 
The emphasis on individual responsibility also concerns Susan Hurley, who 
criticizes the notion of rational agency usually underlying responsibility in traditional 
liberalism. Hurley argues that this notion of rational agency is called into question by 
empirical research in the cognitive sciences. She claims that responsibility is not private 
but should be understood according to a public ecology that recognizes the social, 
cultural and political environment that makes responsibility possible.   
 
David Miller investigates whether we have a duty to ‘take up the slack’ where 
there is collective responsibility for averting a harm and some of the agents who share 
this responsibility do not comply. He argues that justice generally requires agents to 
contribute only their fair share (no more or less), but that in exceptional circumstances, 
they might be permitted to do less than their fair share or required to do more, i.e., to take 
up the slack.  
 
Desert and its relationship to justice and egalitarianism are what concern Larry 
Temkin and Carl Knight. Temkin works through an analysis of different conceptions of 
justice and fairness to defend ‘equality as comparative fairness’, arguing that egalitarians 
are not concerned with luck per se but with how people fare relative to each other in 
terms, primarily, of desert. Knight argues that desert-based conceptions of justice match 
our intuitions about justice better than responsibility-sensitive notions of justice. 
 
Matt Matravers contradicts the commonly accepted claim that the Rawlsian 
approach to distributive justice should not be applied to retributive justice. Matravers 
suggests that both of these forms of justice should start with a commitment to equal 
moral worth which does not translate people’s natural assets, such as a lack of 
intelligence or a predisposition to aggression, into unequal starting points. 
 
Peter Vallentyne’s contribution focuses on how the imaginary outcomes of false 
beliefs (outcomes foreseen by the agent that are not real) could affect broad agent 
Philosophy in Review XXXII (2012), no. 2 
 113 
responsibility. He speculatively suggests that these outcomes could eliminate or reduce, 
but should not enhance, an agent’s responsibility for the prudential value of outcomes.   
 
While the individual papers tend to be of excellent quality and I would 
recommend this book to anyone interested in the subject, as a collection, the book 
prompts two related critical comments. The first and seemingly more trivial point is that I 
would have liked the editors to categorize and structure the papers thematically. Few 
scholars read collections of essays from cover to cover—reviewers would probably be the 
primary exception here!—and I am assuming that most readers will want to dip in and 
out of it, concentrating on the particular topics with which they are most concerned. By 
simply presenting the essays in what seems to be a primarily unsorted list of individual 
essays—I did not find the one-paragraph outline in the introduction particularly helpful 
on this point—the volume may be difficult to use in precisely the way I think readers 
would want to use it.  
 
In considering, however, how the editors could have structured the book 
thematically, I realize how difficult this would be, and this raises a potentially more 
significant criticism. The very loose connections I have drawn here between this 
volume’s essays probably provide a clue as to the problem. The essays fall into two broad 
categories: those that deal directly with RSE (i.e., luck egalitarianism and its various 
forms), and those that do not. The essays that are not really about RSE do not fall into a 
neat category or even various neat categories but are extremely varied. Some seem to fit a 
theme entirely of their own—Matt Matravers and Peter Vallentyne’s essays would be 
examples. The problem is thus not simply that the themes have remained unidentified, 
but rather that the volume may lack coherent themes. I believe it might have been 
improved had the themes that do exist (whatever they are) been better highlighted in the 
introduction, and if additional papers had been found or commissioned which could help 
to fill out the more idiosyncratic topics. 
 
There is, however, also a positive side to this criticism. The editors have done an 
excellent job of devising a volume that is not merely about RSE. Much of what is written 
about responsibility and distributive justice is about luck egalitarianism—whether for or 
against. For precisely this reason, other kinds of essays that have been written on 
responsibility and justice are more likely to be innovative and to reach out in varying, 
tentative directions. The editors have made progress in highlighting that there is much 
more to say about responsibility and distributive justice than is given simply in discussion 
of RSE, even if this has simultaneously made many of the essays in the volume 
particularly difficult to categorize. 
 
Carina Fourie 
University of Zürich 
